UK Special Forces Leadership Accused of Suppressing SAS War Crime Evidence in Afghanistan Inquiry
A high-ranking former officer within the UK Special Forces (UKSF) has delivered "explosive" testimony to a public inquiry, alleging that two former heads of all UK Special Forces actively suppressed evidence of potential war crimes committed by the Special Air Service (SAS) in Afghanistan. The officer, identified only as N1466, claimed that leadership was "very much suppressing" these grave allegations.
Allegations of Deliberate Suppression
N1466, one of the most senior figures in special forces at the time, recounted providing "explosive" evidence hinting at "criminal behaviour" to the then-Director Special Forces in 2011. He further asserted that the subsequent director, who assumed the role in 2012, was fully aware of the "problem in Afghanistan" but also failed to act. Crucially, N1466 confirmed that neither director reported these serious allegations to the Royal Military Police (RMP), despite British law mandating commanders to inform the RMP of any suspected serious criminal offenses by personnel under their command.
This testimony holds significant weight as N1466 is the highest-ranking former special forces officer to publicly accuse SAS leadership of evidence suppression concerning war crimes. His evidence comes from summaries of closed-door hearings conducted by the Independent Inquiry relating to Afghanistan, which is scrutinizing alleged special forces war crimes. Due to inquiry rules, the names of the accused former directors cannot be reported directly from N1466's testimony, though previous BBC Panorama reporting identified General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith (director in 2012) and Lieutenant General Jonathan Page (preceding director) in relation to similar allegations of failing to inform the RMP.
Suspicious Killings and Whistleblower Accounts
N1466's concerns first emerged in February 2011, when he observed a disturbing pattern in SAS reports from Afghanistan: unusually high numbers of killings in suspicious circumstances, often with a disproportionately low number of enemy weapons recovered. A particular night raid where nine Afghan men died and only three weapons were supposedly found fueled his suspicions. Years later, BBC Panorama visited the site and found bullet holes suggesting victims were shot while lying down, contradicting the SAS's firefight narrative.
Further troubling evidence included whistleblower accounts of SAS troopers boasting about killing all "fighting-age" males during operations, irrespective of threat. This, combined with operational reports, led N1466 to be "deeply troubled by what I strongly suspected was the unlawful killing of innocent people, including children." He stated unequivocally, "we are talking about war crimes."
Internal Review as "Warning Shot"
In response to his growing alarm, N1466 commissioned a review of recent SAS operations in April 2011. The review's findings were "startlingly bad" for the SAS and formed part of the evidence he presented to the 2011 Director Special Forces. N1466 testified he "indicated quite clearly to him" the strong potential for criminal behaviour, and that the director "absolutely knew what was happening" and his responsibilities.
Instead of contacting the RMP, the director ordered an internal review of the SAS squadron's tactics – a move N1466 characterized as a "warning shot" to reduce violence. N1466 alleged the director made "a conscious decision that he is going to suppress this, cover it up and do a little fake exercise to make it look like he's done something." This subsequent review, conducted by an SAS officer, only consulted other Regiment members and ultimately accepted the accounts of those suspected of unlawful killings.
Legal Obligations and Delayed Reporting
Bruce Houlder KC, a former director of service prosecutions, underscored the "very clear duty" on commanding officers to report suspected crimes, including murder. He stated he would have investigated the DSF for failure to report in 2011.
N1466 eventually reported his evidence directly to the RMP in January 2015, nearly four years after his initial concerns, and only after the RMP had initiated its own investigation, Operation Northmoor. He expressed "great regret" for not reporting sooner, reflecting on how the deaths of innocent people, including "two toddlers shot in their bed," might have been prevented. He cited an August 2012 raid in Nimruz province, where two parents and their infant sons were shot, as an example of an incident that occurred after the new director took over and was never reported to military police.
Directors' Responses
The director who took office in 2012 has refuted N1466's allegations, stating that he will provide a comprehensive response to the inquiry. He maintained that no senior commanders raised concerns or presented evidence of unlawful killings during his three-year tenure, and thus he was aware of no allegations requiring referral to the RMP. The former director from 2011 did not respond to requests for comment.
